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By judgement issued on 15.7.2008 (and entered on
9.1.2009) the Court of Appeal of Palermo, with regard
to matters brought before this Court, confirmed the
liability of:
Counsel for BA.Pa. (defendant) raised:
Violation of law and defective grounds in respect of
admittance of evidence gathered pursuant to
investigative activities ordered by the Public
Prosecutor by warrant of 22.4.2004. The Prosecutor’s
“warrant for the seizure of documents pursuant to
article 234 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure”,
dated 22.4.2004, authorised the seizure of copies of
(digital) documents stored on a personal computer
presumed to be used by BA.Pa., and installed at the
offices of the drinking water purifier of the
Municipality of Villafrati.
In their appeal, counsel for the defence argued that
the aforesaid prosecutorial warrant, albeit limited in
scope to the seizure of mere copies of documents, in
fact authorised the interception of electronic
communications within the meaning of article 266-bis
and following of the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure, since it provided for copies to be made not
only of the files already present on the personal
computer, but also of data to be stored on the same in
the future, by periodically obtaining access to the
computer’s memory. In support of this position,
counsel for the defence cited the actual procedures
followed to execute the warrant in question, that is to
say, the deliberate infection of the personal
computer’s operating system with ghost software
specifically designed to copy all currently stored files,
and memorise, in real time, all the data processed on
the operating system, effectively subjecting the
computer to surreptitious ongoing monitoring (that
continued for over eight months).
The Court of Appeal, it is contended, rejected this line
of reasoning, by ruling, to the contrary, that the
interception engaged in by police officers with the
Public Prosecutor’s authorisation could be deemed to
fall within the scope of article 266-bis of the Italian
Code of Criminal Procedure, since the data copied did
not pertain to a “flow of information” which entails a
dialogue with other parties, but rather to “an
operative relationship between the electronic
system’s microprocessor and screen”, “a one-way
data flow” confined to the personal computer’s
internal circuitry.
According to the appellant, the lower court’s ruling
reflects an erroneous finding at law, given that the
digital and electronic interception was, in fact, carried
out with a view to obtaining copies of “a flow of
communications pertaining to systems, or amongst
several electronic or computer systems”, and no
account ought to be taken of the number of users
(which could well be only one) interacting with the
intercepted system.
The appellant argues that article 266-bis of the Italian
Code of Criminal Procedure reformed the previously
prevailing regulatory framework, not only by
extending the scope of the admissibility of intercept
evidence to include use of the same for the
prosecution of computer crime, but also by permitting
recourse to the interception of the flow of digital data
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1 The appellant went on to allege that the digital
evidence copied from the personal computer
should be seized in an adversarial setting, that is
in the presence of the lawyer of the person under
investigation.
(bits) within individual systems or amongst several
systems, regardless of the number of persons
involved in the electronic interaction.
The investigative techniques actually used by the law
enforcement officers in execution of the Public
Prosecutor’s warrant of 22.4.2004 (installation of a
data-copying software on the operating system, the
continuing, surreptitious, real-time copying of the
flow of data input into the system by the user), it is
contended, amount to interception of digital
communications within the meaning of article 266-bis
of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure.
Consequently, the evidence gathered pursuant to the
electronic interception carried out in the case at hand,
in disregard of the provisions of article 266-bis and
following of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure,
ought to be deemed inadmissible pursuant to article
271 of the Code.
In any event, it is argued, the material collected by
investigators in itself amounts to “unconstitutional
evidence” that must necessarily be disallowed
pursuant to article 191 of the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure.
The appellant raises the violation of article 14 of the
Italian Constitution which entrenches the inviolability
of the home, and article 15 of the Constitution which
guarantees the freedom and confidentiality of
correspondence. Contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, the offices at which BA. worked on an ongoing
and permanent basis, whilst open to the public, must
be deemed to constitute a “home”, and any and all
messages and letters processed on the premises,
both in the past and at present, must be considered
the defendant’s personal correspondence. The
appellant further contends that the Public
Prosecutor’s warrant also stands in breach of articles
24 and 111 of the Italian Constitution.
On points of procedure, it is argued, that the rules
regulating unrepeatable evidence-gathering
techniques (articles 359 and 360 of the Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure) were not followed, resulting in
additional statutory violations.
Moreover, it is contended, pursuant to article 189 of
the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, the digital
evidence copied from the personal computer ought to
have been seized in an adversarial setting.1
The appellant goes on to allege that the precise date
of the Public Prosecutor’s warrant of 22.4.2004,
cannot be determined since there is no documentary
evidence of its formal filing and entry in official
records, and lastly, that the copied electronic
documents ought to be disallowed even pursuant to
article 240 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure
which focuses on anonymous writings, given that the




The first ground for appeal repeats arguments that
have already been properly rejected, first at the
Preliminary Hearing at which the case was remanded
to trial, and subsequently, by the Court of Appeal
which exhaustively explained its reasoning in depth,
and followed settled precedent on matters of
constitutionality, as stated in its ratio decidendi with
which no fault whatsoever can be found despite the
appellant’s well-presented arguments.
The main argument is based on the erroneous
assumption that the interception of digital or
electronic communications within the meaning of
article 266-bis of the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure was carried out for the purpose of copying
“a flow of communications pertaining to systems or
amongst several electronic or computer systems”, and
that no account ought to be taken of the number of
users (which could well be only one) interacting with
the intercepted system.
This erroneous assumption leads to the equally
erroneous conclusion that the interception authorised
by the Public Prosecutor through the warrant of
22.4.2004, was subject to the regulatory framework
contemplated in article 266-bis of the Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure, since it entails the copying of a
“flow of communications”.
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The trial court which held to the contrary that the
prosecutorial warrant in question was limited to
authorising law enforcement officers to extrapolate
data already stored on the personal computer used by
BA., as well as any and all data to be stored on the
same in the future, quite rightly pointed out that “a
flow of communications must be construed as the
transmission, on-site or remote transfer of
information (from a transmitting source to a receiver,
from one person to another, and that is to say, the
dialogue of communications under way within a
system or amongst several electronic or computer
systems (Supreme Court of Cassation, sitting as a full
court, decision no. 6 of 23.2.2000)), and this
definition cannot be deemed to be met by the mere
processing or expression of thought in digital form
using a word processor to produce an electronically
stored document, rather than by writing graphical
symbols on paper”. In the case at hand, the activities
authorised by the Public Prosecutor with a view to
“obtaining copies of documents stored on the hard
drive of the computer used by BA.”, had for their
subject-matter and focus, not a “flow of
communications” entailing a dialogue with other
persons or parties, but “an operative relationship
between the electronic system’s microprocessor and
screen”, or a “a one-way data flow” confined to the
personal computer’s internal circuitry.
As a result, the trial court quite rightly ruled that the
probative materials obtained pursuant to the
interception in question, qualified as “atypical
evidence” falling outside the scope of the regulatory
framework imposed under articles 266 and following
of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, and
consequently, found the related documents
admissible at trail.
The appellate court has also adequately addressed all
the other arguments.
The court properly held that the interception violated
neither article 14 nor article 15 of the Italian
Constitution. As a matter of fact, the computer
monitored pursuant to the installation of the ghost
software was not located at a private residence or on
residential premises, even in the broadest sense of
the term, but at a place open to the public. The
computer was “located on premises serving as a
public municipal office, accessible to both the
defendant and the other employees, in the
performance of their official duties, as well as, albeit
only during specific hours, the general public of users
and cleaning staff, and that is to say, a whole
community of persons with a membership that, whilst
admittedly not particularly large, may in no way be
deemed subject to restrictions or other pre-conditions
established on the basis of the defendant’s personal
decisions”. Moreover, the constitutional protection of
the confidentiality of correspondence and
communications, in general, cannot be invoked in the
case at hand, given that “the material copied was not
a text forwarded and transmitted using the computer
system, but merely a draft to printed on paper before
being delivered to the addressee”.
The district court also rightly held that the rules
governing unrepeatable evidence gathering
techniques could not be deemed applicable in the
present case, since the stored files were copied
without altering them in any way or otherwise
destroying the electronic database which remained
unchanged, and was therefore fully consultable and
accessible at the same conditions, after police officers
had completed their task. The techniques used were
always repeatable, and there was no need for the
presence of defence counsel, given that the copying
could be carried out a second time during the trial,
where necessary for procedural purposes.
The appellate court also correctly precluded the
applicability of the rules imposed under article 189 of
the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as the
documentary evidence retrieved from the personal
computer was not seized in an adversarial setting as a
result of the defendant’s decision to opt for a fast-
track trial, and the requirement for the proceedings to
be conducted in an adversarial setting applies to the
identification of sources of evidence, and not to
evidence gathering procedures.
In respect of the argument focusing on the
uncertainty surrounding the date of the warrant in
question, given the lack of documentary evidence of
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the formal filing and entry of the same in official
records, the trial court, in line with settled case law on
constitutionality, held that the date on which the
warrant was formally issued could be determined with
certainty using other sources, including other
documents of equal probative value as the official
record, and, in the case at hand, the report
specifically referring to the warrant, and duly filed by
the Mobile Squad with the secretariat of the Palermo
Public Prosecutors’ Office, on 26.4.2004.
With regard to alleged inadmissibility of the evidence
gathered in execution of the warrant dated 22.4.2004,
pursuant to article 240 of the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure, in the appealed judgement, the trial court
underlined the probative elements establishing that
the documents were drawn up by BA., correctly
pointing out that, albeit bereft of signature, the
documents could not be deemed anonymous or of
unknown or undetermined authorship within the
meaning of article 240 which, moreover, permits
reliance on writings “howsoever” written by the
defendant.
[omissis]
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